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I
INTRODUCTION
The Arab Spring recently highlighted the problem of migrants at sea and the shortcomings of the inter-
national legal framework. Indeed, due to the social uprisings in Tunisia and Libya, thousands of people tried
to reach Europe by sea. This is a dangerous journey, as these asylum seekers often travel in unseaworthy
vessels. As a result of the Arab Spring, it is estimated that more than 1,500 people drowned or went missing
while attempting to cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe in 2011. [FN1] These events are a reminder of
the extreme actions that desperate people will take. The international community is aware that this problem
has to be tackled as soon as possible in order to prevent further loss of life.
This article first deals with the current international legal framework concerning migrants at sea and its
shortcomings. Second, we take a look at how Malta interprets the existing obligations. Third, recent devel-
opments within the International Maritime Organization (IMO) on the Draft Regional Agreement for the
Mediterranean Basin - an agreement hoping to solve the problem of disembarking migrants at sea in the
Mediterranean - will be highlighted. Finally, we will discuss how Malta - a small State of only 316 km2 -
influences the content of the agreement and how this island itself is being affected by it.
*90 II
THE UNDEFINABLE DEFINED - DISTRESS, RESCUE AND PLACE OF SAFETY
A. Between Duty And Discretion
It is a legal obligation for shipmasters and States under customary international law, [FN2] as well as un-
der Articles 58(2) and 98(1) of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), to render assistance to persons
in danger of being lost and to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress. Although
the LOSC only mentions this duty in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and on the high seas, [FN3] a
State cannot rely on its sovereign powers to disregard this obligation in its territorial sea. [FN4] As assist-
ance must be given to any person, [FN5] the obligation applies regardless of the persons' nationality or
status or the circumstances in which they are found. [FN6] Therefore, migrants cannot be excluded from
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this obligation.
Although there is a duty to assist persons in danger of being lost, only a distress situation requires a res-
cue. There is a variety of acts that may constitute assistance, for example to tow the vessel to safety, extric-
ate a grounded vessel, fight a fire aboard a ship, provide food and supplies, embark crewmen aboard to re-
place the tired or the missing, secure aid or assistance from other nearby ships, or simply stand-by to provide
navigational advice. [FN7] The *91 1989 International Convention on Salvage (Salvage Convention) also
mentions this general duty to provide assistance. [FN8]
The actual distress phase is defined by the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue
(SAR Convention) [FN9] as: “A situation wherein there is reasonable certainty that a person, a vessel or oth-
er craft is threatened by grave and imminent danger and requires immediate assistance.” [FN10] Exactly
when a situation requires immediate assistance can be subject to different interpretations according to which
State is handling the situation. For some States the vessel must really be on the point of sinking. [FN11]
However, the International Law Commission stated that - although a situation of distress may at most in-
clude a situation of serious danger - it is not necessarily one that jeopardizes the life of the persons con-
cerned. [FN12] In contrast, for other States it is sufficient for the vessel to be unseaworthy. [FN13]
MORENO-LAX even suggests that unseaworthiness per se entails distress. [FN14]
Council Decision 2010/252/EU [FN15] adopted additional guidelines that must be respected by
European Member States during search and rescue situations*92 at sea. When deciding whether a vessel is
in distress, search and rescue units should take all relevant elements into account, in particular:
(a) the existence of a request for assistance; (b) the seaworthiness of the ship and the likelihood
that the ship will not reach its final destination; (c) the number of passengers in relation to the type of
ship (overloading); (d) the availability of necessary supplies (fuel, water, food, etc.) to reach a shore;
(e) the presence of qualified crew and command of the ship; (f) the availability of safety, navigation
and communication equipment; (g) the presence of passengers in urgent need of medical assistance;
(h) the presence of deceased passengers; (i) the presence of pregnant women or children; and (j) the
weather and sea conditions. [FN16]
Thus - according to these guidelines - although unseaworthiness is certainly an element to take into con-
sideration when assessing the situation, it does not automatically imply a distress situation. Indeed, every
situation is different and whether persons at sea are in distress or not will depend on the specific circum-
stances. Therefore, an assessment can only be made on a case-by-case basis. Although the definition of dis-
tress is quite vague, it is essential that shipmasters and States have the discretion to take all relevant ele-
ments into account in order to decide whether persons are in distress. However, one element that is indisput-
able is that the existence of an emergency should not be exclusively dependent on, or determined by, an ac-
tual request for assistance. [FN17]
B. The SAR Convention To The Rescue
Every flag State must require the master of a ship flying its flag to proceed with all possible speed to the
rescue of persons in distress when informed of their need of assistance. [FN18] Coastal States shall establish
adequate and effective search and rescue services (for example, through the creation of a Rescue Co-
ordination Centre or RCC) and, where circumstances so require, cooperate with neighbouring States for this
purpose. [FN19] The basic elements*93 for a search and rescue service are a legal framework, the assign-
ment of a responsible authority, the organization of available resources, communication facilities, coordina-
tion and operational functions and processes to improve the service including planning, domestic and inter-
national cooperative relationships and training. [FN20]
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Rescue can be described as “an operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial medical
or other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety.” [FN21] Until the adoption of the SAR Convention,
there was actually no international system covering search and rescue operations. Consequently, in some
areas there was a well-established organization able to provide assistance promptly and efficiently, whereas
in other areas there was nothing at all. The SAR Convention thus aims at developing an international search
and rescue plan. As a result, no matter where an accident occurs, the rescue of persons in distress at sea will
be co-ordinated by a search and rescue organization and - when necessary - by co-operation between neigh-
bouring search and rescue organizations. [FN22]
Basically, the world's oceans are divided into 13 search and rescue areas, in each of which the countries
concerned have delimited search and rescue regions for which they are responsible. [FN23] States must en-
sure that sufficient Search and Rescue Regions (SRR) are established within each sea area. These regions
should be contiguous and - as far as practicable - not overlap. [FN24] Each SRR shall be established by
agreement among the parties concerned. [FN25] The delimitation of an SRR is not related to, and shall not
prejudice, the delimitation of any boundary between States. [FN26]
Parties are required to ensure the closest practicable coordination between maritime and aeronautical
services. [FN27] The International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR Manu-
al) - which was jointly published by IMO and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) -
provides guidelines for a common aviation and maritime approach to organizing and providing search and
rescue services. [FN28] For the moment, *94 several States in the Mediterranean have unilaterally declared
a SRR. However, there is no regional agreement yet on the coordination among them. [FN29]
C. Place Of Safety: A Guarantee For A Safe Place?
Rescue implies that persons in distress have to be delivered to a place of safety. [FN30] The IMO
Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea state that a place of safety can be defined as a loca-
tion where rescue operations are considered to terminate, where the survivors' safety or life is no longer
threatened, basic human needs (such as food, shelter and medical needs) can be met and transportation ar-
rangements can be made for the survivors' next or final destination. [FN31] Disembarkation of asylum-
seekers recovered at sea, in territories where their lives and freedom would be threatened, must be avoided
[FN32] in order to prevent the violation of the non-refoulement principle. [FN33] Also Council Decision
2010/252/EU [FN34] stated that the non-refoulement principle should be respected. [FN35]
The Government responsible for the SRR in which survivors were recovered will be responsible for
providing a place of safety, or ensuring that such a place of safety is provided. [FN36] Although an assisting
ship may only serve as a temporary place of safety, [FN37] there is no actual duty for States to disembark
*95 the persons rescued. [FN38] Both the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Con-
vention) and the SAR Convention state that States must arrange for the disembarkation of persons rescued at
sea as soon as reasonably practicable. [FN39] In other words, a State can refuse disembarkation onto its own
territory or make this dependent on certain conditions. [FN40]
Ironically, the ‘place of safety’ provision often hinders migrants from being brought to a safe place in an
efficient way. Because there is no clear disembarkation duty, persons rescued at sea can spend weeks on a
ship at sea before a State allows them to go ashore. [FN41] On 11 July 2011, the Almirante Juan de Borbón
- a Spanish frigate participating in NATO Operation Unified Protector - rescued 114 migrants from drown-
ing in the Mediterranean. After the vessel left Libya, the engine broke down and the persons on board drifted
for two days without food or water. When the warship was informed about their condition, they provided
immediate assistance. On 13 July 2011, a man and his pregnant wife were brought to Malta for medical
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treatment. Spain agreed to receive a 10-month-old baby. However, Spain, Italy and Malta all refused to ac-
cept disembarkation onto their territory. Malta stated that NATO was responsible for the problem. Eventu-
ally, the migrants were transferred to Tunisia on 16 July 2011. [FN42] This was a violation of the non-
refoulement principle because some of the asylum-seekers were of Tunisian origin and there is political tur-
moil in the country.
The fact that the Government of the SRR in which the survivors were recovered is responsible for
providing a place of safety, or ensuring that such a place of safety is provided, means that migrants in dis-
tress at sea are sometimes ignored or brought to the SRR of another State. Indeed, States know that they will
not only be responsible for providing assistance, but also for the place of safety. In March 2011, a boat car-
rying 72 migrants spent 16 days drifting in the Mediterranean after it had left Tripoli destined for Italy. *96
Migrants stated that several ships and even a NATO aircraft carrier ignored their pleas for help. The out-
of-fuel ship eventually washed up on a western Libyan beach. Only 11 people survived while the others had
died of thirst and starvation at sea. [FN43] There are even testimonies of asylum-seekers that the Greek
Coast Guard, for example, tows ships carrying migrants into the Turkish SRR. [FN44]
Although recent international and European soft law initiatives do focus on a real disembarkation duty,
they also put too much burden on the coastal States. Indeed, the 2009 IMO Guidelines on Principles Relating
to Administrative Procedures for Disembarking Persons Rescued at Sea mention that if disembarkation from
the rescuing ship cannot be arranged swiftly elsewhere, the Government responsible for the SRR should ac-
cept the disembarkation. [FN45] Similarly, Council Decision 2010/252/EU states in its guidelines regarding
disembarkation that priority should be given to the third country from where the ship carrying the persons
departed, or through the territorial waters or SRR through which that ship transited. [FN46] If this is not
possible, priority should be given to disembarkation in the Member State hosting the surveillance operation
at sea. [FN47] Without any prior agreement on burden-sharing between States, the life of many migrants is
being jeopardized. It is estimated that for every 100 people safely landing after a dangerous journey in the
Mediterranean, 5 people drown without leaving any trace. [FN48] However, some States fear that clarifying
obligations and solving the problem through burden-sharing would produce an enormous pull factor, thus
encouraging migrants to come to Europe by sea. [FN49]
*97 III
MALTA - A DISTINCT VIEW ON MIGRANTS AT SEA?
A. Setting The Scene
Malta is a small island of only 316 km2. Nevertheless, in some ways Malta has a bigger stake in the
Mediterranean than most of the other coastal States. It is an island State with an important fishing industry, a
high level of tourism, and other marine-related industries such as shipbuilding and ship repair. Therefore,
Malta is clearly one of the Mediterranean's most ocean-dependent States. As a result, maritime affairs - es-
pecially those of a political kind - are followed keenly by the Maltese people. [FN50] Due to its population
density, the island feels under pressure from migrants arriving by boat across the Mediterranean. [FN51]
Malta is a party to the 1982 LOSC [FN52] and is thus bound by the legal obligations therein. Although
Malta accessed the 1974 SOLAS Convention on 8 August 1986 and the 1979 SAR Convention on 24
September 2002, [FN53] it has not yet signed the 2004 SOLAS and SAR Amendments. On 22 December
2005, the IMO received a communication from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malta declaring that Malta
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“is not yet in a position to accept these amendments.” [FN54] The Armed Forces of Malta (AFM) are re-
sponsible for the search and rescue operations. The Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) operates jointly
with the AFM in the event of an aeronautical incident. [FN55] Although there is a certain amount of discre-
tion in deciding whether a person is in distress, the AFM has been accused of not fulfilling their duty, by for
example only helping persons who are actually requesting assistance. [FN56]
*98 B. Coping With An Enormous SRR
In 2001, COMSAR/Circ.27 invited States to submit all details concerning the current availability of their
SAR services as well as the exact coordinates of their SRR. [FN57] Malta submitted this information on 30
September 2005. [FN58] Although Malta is only a small country, it claimed a maritime SRR that coincides
with the Malta Aeronautical SRR and the Malta Flight Information Region (FIR). [FN59] Since the country
‘inherited’ an enormous Flight Identification Region (FIR) from Great Britain, Malta is now responsible for
a region that amounts to 250,000 km2. Toward the west, the Maltese SRR almost reaches the territorial wa-
ters of Tunisia. Toward the east, it nearly stretches to Crete. Moreover, toward the north, Malta claimed part
of the same area as Italy. This is reflected on the map which was attached to SAR.8/Circ.3. [FN60] For ex-
ample, the Italian island of Lampedusa is both part of the Maltese and the Italian SRR. Migrants coming
from the North African coast and crossing the Mediterranean to reach Italy, have to pass through the Maltese
SRR.
Although Italy is pressuring Malta to give up part of this vast area, this is definitely not an option for the
Maltese government. One of the reasons is that this area is connected to the lucrative income the island de-
rives from its Flight Information Region (FIR), as the size of the latter is bound to the SRR. Malta earns mil-
lions of euros a year from air traffic control charges on aircraft using the area. In addition, there are rumours
that Malta thinks the SRR could be an asset when delimiting its continental shelf. [FN61] Indeed, Malta's
maritime boundary system is only partially delimited [FN62] and there are strong indications of oil and gas
resources in the areas between Tunisia and Malta on the one hand, and Sicily and Malta on the other. [FN63]
However, the SAR Convention is very clear on this issue. It states that the delimitation of the SRR is not re-
lated to, and shall not prejudice, the delimitation of any boundary between States. [FN64]
*99 But is Malta actually able to operate this unilaterally declared SRR? First of all, the unilateral de-
claration of the Maltese SRR is subject to the principle of good faith. This principle creates a need to ensure
compliance with unilateral commitments. [FN65] However, the SAR Convention only asks States to co-
ordinate search and rescue services in the area under their responsibility. Thus, there is no obligation for
States to do this individually as they can act in cooperation with other States. [FN66]
For example, on 6 April 2011, Malta informed the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre of the
presence of a boat in distress, 45 miles from the Italian island of Lampedusa. As Maltese patrol boats were
temporarily unavailable, Italian search and rescue assets were shipped to the area. The boat - which had de-
parted from the Libyan port of Zuara - carried some 300 persons who were fleeing the north coast of Africa
in search of a better life. However, that type of vessel normally only held a maximum of 40 people.
Moreover, the engine was severely damaged, which made it impossible to manoeuvre the boat. Over 250 mi-
grants were lost after their vessel capsized due to flooding. Eventually, only 52 persons could be saved by
the Italian Coast Guard. [FN67]
The fact that Italy was asked to deal with the rescue does not mean that Malta did not live up to its oblig-
ations under the SAR Convention. However, is the Maltese coordination efficient enough if 250 migrants are
lost? Moreover, due to an overlap of the Maltese and the Italian SRR, there can be a delay in deciding who
is responsible, thus jeopardizing the lives of migrants in distress. Although the SAR Convention mentions
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that overlaps have to be avoided as far as practicable, [FN68] it also states that SRR's should be established
by agreement among parties. [FN69] That has not been the case up until today.
*100 C. Humanitarian Aspect
According to Malta there is a safe place in terms of search and rescue, and in terms of humanitarian law.
[FN70] However, as Malta did not sign the 2004 SOLAS and SAR Amendments, and as it does not accept
the 2004 IMO Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, it does not recognize the link
between the two concepts which was established in these instruments. Malta does not accept any link
between the responsibility for the search and rescue, and the responsibility for providing a place of safety or
ensuring that such a place of safety is provided.
Nevertheless, the Council Decision 2010/252/EU also mentions that no person shall be disembarked in,
or otherwise handed over to the authorities of, a country in contravention of the principle of non-re-
foulement. [FN71] However, these guidelines are only applicable with regard to the surveillance of the sea
external borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by Frontex, the European Agency for
the management of operational cooperation at the external borders of the Member States. [FN72] This means
that when Malta is acting outside a Frontex surveillance operation, these guidelines will not be applicable.
Due to the 2012 ECtHR judgment in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, the principle of non-refoulement will
be applicable when a State has continuous and exclusive control over persons. [FN73]
It is however understandable that Malta wants to separate the two concepts as the country is situated at
the frontline of European border controls. The Dublin II Regulation is regarded as unfavourable for Malta as
the Member State responsible for an asylum claim will be the State through which the asylum seeker first
entered the European Union. Therefore, the country considers burden-sharing a crucial element. [FN74] De
Blouw believes that the modification of the Dublin Regulation is the first and most important step to eradic-
ating human rights abuses in Southern Europe as this could lessen the immigration burden on coastal Medi-
terranean Member States. [FN75] To help Malta to cope with the migration problem, EUREMA (European
*101 Relocation Malta) - a pilot project for intra-EU re-allocation of beneficiaries of protection from Malta
- was launched in July 2009. It was co-funded by the EU under the ERF and supported by IOM and UN-
HCR. Its objectives are the implementation of the principle of solidarity among States, the identification of
resettlement solutions for people in need and the improvement of the situation for those who remain in
Malta. However, this project is not a solution to the negative impact of the Dublin II Regulation. [FN76]
IV
A TAILOR-MADE SOLUTION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN
A. From An International To A Regional Approach
1. A Slow Start
At the meeting of the IMO Sub-Committee on Radio Communications and Search and Rescue
(COMSAR) in March 2010, the United States stated that the discussions between Mediterranean countries
concerning rescue and disembarkation of migrants at sea represent a regional problem requiring a regional
solution. However, Italy, Malta and Spain expressed their disappointment that other countries seemingly did
44 JMARLC 89 Page 6
44 J. Mar. L. & Com. 89
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
not recognize that the problem was more than simply a regional one. Indeed, other parts of the world are
also confronted with similar difficulties and, even more importantly, ships of all flags are currently involved
in the resulting rescue operations. Therefore, the IMO Secretary-General proposed to develop a pilot project
for a regional solution in the Mediterranean. If this project works, it could be applied in other parts of the
world. [FN77]
One of the primary concerns of the IMO is the integrity of the search and rescue and, consequently, the
safety of life at sea regime. [FN78] Therefore, the IMO wants to prevent incidents which cause loss of life
at sea from recurring. [FN79] COMSAR launched the idea of developing a pilot project for a regional solu-
tion in the Mediterranean in March 2010. On the one hand, the system of rescuing migrants in the Medi-
terranean Basin has to be improved. *102 On the other hand, these persons also have to be disembarked at
a place of safety in accordance with the SAR and SOLAS Conventions. [FN80] If the project works, it could
be extended to other parts of the world experiencing similar situations. [FN81]
Meanwhile, the IMO is even waiting to take steps on the international level - for example amending the
Facilitation Convention [FN82] - until the results of this Regional Agreement are ready. [FN83] In May
2010 the IMO Secretary-General made available his good offices to take this matter forward for informal
consultations with a group of interested parties. [FN84] A first draft of the Terms of Reference for such a
consultation group was established by the IMO Secretariat in co-operation with interested parties, including
Italy, Malta and Spain. [FN85]
A first meeting of the consultation group was held under the auspices of, and chaired by, the IMO Sec-
retary-General on 28 July 2010. It was attended by representatives from Italy, Malta, Spain and the IMO
Secretariat. The meeting agreed upon the Terms of Reference for the group and finalized a list of issues to
be discussed in the development of a Regional Agreement on concerted procedures relating to the disem-
barkation of persons rescued at sea. The IMO Secretariat prepared a draft for this Regional Agreement
which was tabled for the parties concerned to consider and to comment. [FN86] However, the delegations of
Italy, Malta and Spain requested an extension of the target completion date to 2012 because there has not
been sufficient progress made. [FN87] Indeed, a second meeting had to be postponed due to the non-
availability of delegations. [FN88] Italy requested that the consultation group of interested parties should be
extended to the other relevant regional institutions, for instance the European Union, in order to avoid the
stalling of future consultations due to the non-availability of delegations. [FN89]
*103 2. Arab Spring - A Speed Up
In 2011, States however realized that the situation in the Mediterranean region had deteriorated over
the months following the first meeting. The urgency of making progress on the issue was stressed, as a con-
sequence of a wave of social uprisings affecting the northern part of the African continent, resulting in a
massive migration by sea towards Europe. [FN90] In March 2011, NATO warships as well as aircraft star-
ted patrolling the approaches to Libyan territorial waters as part of ‘Operation Unified Protector.’ As called
for in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, [FN91] their purpose was to reduce the flow of
arms, related material and mercenaries to Libya. This operation is part of the broad international effort to
protect civilians in Libya from the violence committed by the Gaddafi regime. [FN92]
However, there were growing signs that Gaddafi's regime was trying to force a migration crisis to use as
a weapon against his NATO enemies. [FN93] Indeed, according to the International Organisation for Migra-
tion (IOM), some migrants stated that they were forced onto boats by Libyan troops and police. Migrants
who were brought to safety on the Italian island of Lampedusa said they witnessed a boat - carrying between
500 and 600 people - sink off the Libyan coast. Although some of the persons were able to swim to the
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shore, it is not clear how many migrants survived. After seeing what had happened to the first boat, many of
the migrants - who had been waiting on land to take another boat - changed their mind about making the sea
journey to Italy. However, they claim that Libyan soldiers and officials forced them onto a waiting boat by
firing their guns indirectly. [FN94]
On 6 April 2011, a second meeting - again under the auspices of and chaired by the IMO Secretary-Gener-
al - was held to further this debate. It was once again attended by representatives from Italy, Spain and the
IMO Secretariat. [FN95] On that same day over 250 migrants were lost after their vessel*104 capsized in the
Mediterranean Sea, which proved again how urgent this matter was. [FN96] The Terms of Reference were
reviewed and accepted. [FN97] It was concluded that the development of the Regional Agreement was to:
1. establish and strengthen co-operation among Parties to enable them to cope with incidents in-
volving persons rescued at sea;
2. establish a system of communication between the countries in the region to exchange informa-
tion on the movement of persons by sea;
3. ensure the safety of persons rescued at sea, pending a decision as to the place where such per-
sons will be safely delivered, taking into account the prevailing weather and other conditions, includ-
ing the safety of the delivering ships and the capacity of the places where they are delivered to
provide care as may be necessary under the circumstances;
4. arrange that delivery of persons takes place without undue delays to the rescuing ships which
should be allowed to promptly proceed to their destination once the delivery operation is over; and
5. promote co-operation for the delivery of persons rescued at sea to a port of a place of safety.
[FN98]
The meeting then prepared the draft text for the Regional Agreement to be used as a basis for considera-
tion at a future meeting. [FN99] It was agreed that the group should be expanded to include other interested
parties concerned in the region, such as relevant regional and international organizations. [FN100] Malta
stated that it was unable to attend the second meeting and that it did not completely agree with the outcome
of that meeting. While they had no difficulties with the essence of the Terms of Reference, Malta believed
that the text needed to be revised in the interest of clarity and consistency. Moreover, Malta had reservations
on both the expansion of the consultation group and the draft text of the Regional Agreement. The country
therefore proposed another meeting to discuss all these issues. [FN101]
The third meeting of the consultation group was held on 15 June 2011. That meeting further developed
the Terms of Reference and discussed a draft Regional Agreement on concerted procedures relating to the
disembarkation of persons rescued at sea. It was also agreed that the consultation group *105 should be ex-
panded. [FN102] As a first expansion step, all of the Mediterranean countries were invited through Circular
letter No. 3203 of 18 August 2011. This regional meeting is being held back-to-back with the parallel celeb-
ration of the World Maritime Day in Rome on 12 October 2011. The ultimate goal here will be the develop-
ment of a Regional Agreement in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on concerted proced-
ures relating to the disembarkation of persons rescued at sea. [FN103] At COMSAR 16, it was considered
beneficial - in order to make significant progress towards finalizing the draft Regional MoU - to hold in-
formal consultations among interested parties to agree on some of the more contentious issues and associ-
ated draft texts before organizing the next regional formal meeting. Accordingly, informal consultations
were held at IMO Headquarters on 21 February 2012. Some of the most contentious aspects were discussed
and agreements reached on sensitive subjects and the draft text of the Regional MoU was improved accord-
ingly. However, after some discussion, taking into account that the work on this matter was still in progress,
COMSAR decided to invite the MSC to extend the target completion year to 2013. MSC has agreed to post-
pone the deadline to 2013. [FN104]
A MoU is a well-accepted legal instrument in international law and practice, and is identified as “an in-
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formal but nevertheless legal agreement” between two or more parties. [FN105] Whether this MoU is meant
to be binding is not clear at the moment. However, a soft law agreement would not necessarily be a negative
factor. Hard and soft law are used as alternatives, and can interact in complementary ways. Legal positivists
tend to favor hard law as it refers to legal obligations of a formally binding nature; soft law refers to duties
that are not formally binding but may nonetheless lead to binding hard law. Rationalists, in contrast, contend
that hard and soft law have distinct attributes that States choose for different contexts, and thus can build
upon each other. Lastly, constructivists maintain that State interests are formed through socialization pro-
cesses of interstate interaction which hard and soft law can facilitate. Therefore, constructivists often favour
soft law instruments for their capacity to generate shared norms and a sense of common purpose and iden-
tity, without the constraints raised by concerns over potential litigation. [FN106]
*106 Regardless of their views about the strengths and weaknesses of hard and soft law, all three schools
examine how hard and soft law can serve as mutually supporting complements to each other. [FN107]
Moreover, soft law can sometimes be more effective than hard law. Whether a law is effective goes beyond
looking at implementation or compliance to determine whether an international norm - whatever its source
in domestic or international law - achieves its policy objective. [FN108] A rule is deemed effective when it
leads to certain behaviour which may or may not meet the legal standard of compliance. [FN109] The devel-
opment of a soft law framework has been successfully applied to address gaps in international law in the
past. [FN110] Barnes states that - consistent with the general trend towards the use of soft law instruments -
new legal initiatives concerning migrants at sea are most likely to take the form of non-binding measures.
[FN111]
B. From An Interagency To A Maritime Approach
During the meetings, it was stressed that the development of a Regional Agreement should be restricted
to purely maritime matters. [FN112] Although the competences of the IMO only extend to the search and
rescue part at sea and to the provision of a place of safety afterwards, [FN113] it is definitely a shift in view
towards the issue. Indeed, William O'Neil - the former IMO Secretary-General - stated in 2001 that the im-
plementation of measures for safety at *107 sea would not suffice since the problem of migrants at sea is
not solely a maritime issue. In a situation involving asylum-seekers, certain principles of refugee law and
human rights must be respected. [FN114] As a result, an Interagency Group was set up in July 2002 to deal
with the problem of migrants at sea. [FN115] The IMO, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (UNDOALOS),
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) are all particip-
ating in this Interagency Group. Countries outside the region have also been invited to future meetings.
[FN116]
It is clear that past developments did not occur in the isolation of particular fields of law, but with a con-
siderable degree of cooperation between international organizations and experts from across a number of
fields. This integrated approach must thus continue. [FN117] The International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea affirmed in the M/V Saiga Case that considerations of humanity must apply to the Law of the Sea as
they do in other areas of international law. [FN118] As Treves correctly stated:
The Law of the Sea and the law of human rights are not separate planets rotating in different or-
bits. Instead, they meet in many situations. Rules of the Law of the Sea are sometimes inspired by hu-
man rights considerations and may or must be interpreted in light of such considerations. [FN119]
Even the IMO itself recognizes this. In April 2011, the IMO stated that the problem is not entirely in
IMO's hands, as political developments - due to the Arab Spring - had exacerbated the situation beyond its
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competence. [FN120]
*108 IV
MALTA AND THE REGIONAL AGREEMENT: A MUTUAL IMPACT
A. The influence of Malta on the Regional Agreement
Why did the IMO suddenly shift towards a purely maritime approach? One of the reasons could be that
they definitely wanted Malta to be part of the agreement. As Malta does not accept a link between the
maritime and the humanitarian elements of the problem, the country could have restraints due to the fact that
the agreement could contain similar provisions as incorporated in the 2004 SOLAS and SAR Amendments
and the IMO Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea. It was indeed remarkable that Malta
was absent during the second meeting of the consultation group in April 2011. The problem is that if Malta
is not willing to negotiate, or decides not to be part of the MoU, there would simply not be an efficient
agreement. Since Malta has an enormous SRR, it is of utmost importance that Malta is included. Including
Malta in the agreement would ensure coordination between the several SRRs in the Mediterranean.
It is also essential that any agreement include a system of burden-sharing, especially if other countries
want Malta to cooperate. However, a few problems arise in this respect. First, some European States fear
that clarifying obligations and solving the problem through burden-sharing would produce an enormous pull
factor, thus encouraging migrants to come to Europe by sea. [FN121] Second, the United States of America
has begun to play a small yet important role in resettling refugees from Malta in order to reduce the burden
for this country. [FN122] Yet, since this agreement is a regional one, this kind of burden-sharing cannot be
included. Third, burden-sharing clearly goes beyond a purely maritime approach.
B. The Influence of the Regional Agreement on Malta
On the one hand, the Regional Agreement is positive for Malta, since a system of burden-sharing
could be established. On the other hand, Malta *109 could be obliged to accept certain provisions in the
2004 SOLAS and SAR Amendments and the IMO Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea.
Moreover, due to the agreement Malta could be forced to give up part of its SRR.
However, if Malta takes part in this new agreement it would definitely improve its reputation. Indeed,
for the moment Malta does not have a very good reputation concerning the treatment of migrants at sea.
First, the reputational theory in international law - as part of the rational choice theory - will be explained.
Second, this theory will be applied to Malta.
1. The reputational theory
Guzman introduced the reputational theory in international law by stating that reputation plays a very
important role in compliance. He identified three factors which enhance the compliance of States with inter-
national law, namely reciprocity, retaliation and reputation. [FN123] Reciprocity works best in bilateral situ-
ations: if one of the two cooperating States refuses to comply with a legal norm, the other may react in the
same way. Consequently, both States lose the benefit of cooperation. However, reciprocity does not work in
all cases. For example norms that concern human rights cannot be based on a reciprocal basis since reciproc-
al behaviour would not affect the violating State at all. [FN124]
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The second factor is the possibility of retaliation. A State may punish another State for non-compliance.
However, imposing a sanction on another State may be very costly for the punishing State. Moreover, in
multilateral situations States have an incentive to free-ride and to hope that another State will punish the vi-
olator. [FN125] Therefore, Guzman stipulates that the third factor - reputation - is the most important one. A
State's calculus over the reputational costs of non-compliance is thus the primary factor for explaining a
State's compliance with international law.
This theory is based upon the assumption that States are rational, self-interested actors. [FN126] States
want to cooperate with other States when it makes them better off. Nonetheless, States need a “good” repu-
tation as this allows them to make more credible promises. As a result of this reputation for cooperativeness,
States may be able to extract higher returns in exchange for their cooperation. [FN127] A reputational theory
must take into account the fact that not *110 all agreements are the same. [FN128] Lipson is convinced that
the more formal and public the agreement - for example a treaty - the higher the reputational costs of non-
compliance. [FN129] Moreover, the more uncertain a performance standard (e.g. vague terms in the treaty),
the less clear it is that a State's behaviour is violating that standard.
However, Guzman's reputational theory does not explain why States überhaupt enter into treaties. In-
deed, as a State's reputation is influenced by its compliance with legal obligations, reputational forces be-
come relevant after a State has accepted legal obligations. Therefore, reputational harm can only occur if a
legal obligation already exists. [FN130] Nevertheless, Geisinger and Stein suggest that reputation also plays
a role in treaty formation. A State will enter into a treaty when the benefits it receives outweigh the costs of
entry and compliance. [FN131] Indeed, compliance with international law is only one of the many dimen-
sions by which States are judged. Hence, it is important to differentiate between the global standing of the
State - or global public opinion - on the one hand and the State's reputation for compliance with internation-
al law on the other hand.
For example, the refusal to take on a legal obligation could influence the popular perception of the State
more than a violation of legal obligations. [FN132] Brewster illustrates this by giving the example of the
United States' refusal to join the Kyoto Protocol on Global Climate Change. This is widely perceived to
have hurt the reputation of the United States. [FN133] On the other hand, violations of international law
might sometimes even improve the popular perception of States. [FN134] Although the NATO bombing of
Serbia to stop the ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia was a violation of international law on the use
of force, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo used the term “illegal but legitimate” to de-
scribe the bombing of Serbia. [FN135]
Therefore, Brewster puts forward a distinction between ‘legality reputation’ and ‘reliability reputation.’
A legality reputation implies strict compliance with legal commitments, while a reliability reputation entails
commitment*111 to the goals of the regime. For instance, a State can completely fulfil its legal obligations
but still develop a reputation for being unreliable. Similarly, the two types of reputations will have different
effects on States' decision making. The United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2001. [FN136] Al-
though this withdrawal was completely legal - the United States gave the notice required by the terms of the
treaty - many States criticized the United States for not upholding international goals of arms limits. A repu-
tation for legal compliance can thus be maintained as long as the State acts in accordance with the treaty's
terms. However, actions that are formally in compliance with a treaty regime might nonetheless signal that a
State is unreliable. By contrast, a reliability reputation might permit some violations of the agreement.
Which kind of reputation is better will be often context specific. If the treaty is very specific, then a reputa-
tion for strict legal compliance might be better. [FN137]
2. Reputation - An incentive for change?
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Assuming Malta is a rational, self-interested State, its reputation will be important in both treaty com-
pliance and treaty formation. We start by taking a look at the current international obligations of Malta,
namely the rescue of persons in distress and the establishment of an efficient SRR. As both legal provisions
are vague, we cannot say that Malta is not in compliance with its obligations. Indeed, there is a certain
amount of discretion in deciding when a person is in distress. It is also not strictly forbidden to have a dis-
proportionate SRR that overlaps with other countries. Therefore, Malta's “legality reputation' remains in-
tact.
But what about Malta's ‘reliability reputation?’ Until now, Malta was able to keep this reputation quite
high. This is a result of the particular circumstances, namely a small island being flooded by migrants and
not getting enough help from other countries. This is also the reason why Malta's refusal to join the 2004
SOLAS and SAR Amendments, and the IMO Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, did
not harm its reputation in such a way that it felt under pressure to actually subscribe to these obligations. In-
deed, Malta officially declared “that it is not yet in a position to accept these amendments.” [FN138] It thus
seems that Malta does want to accept *112 these amendments, but that it simply cannot do so because of the
current situation.
However, Malta cannot invoke these arguments to avoid negotiating the new Regional Agreement.
After the absence of Malta during the second meeting of the consultation group, the country stated that they
would be available for future meetings. [FN139] Indeed, Malta feels pressure to cooperate in order to find a
solution to the problems arising from the Arab Spring.
The 2004 SOLAS and SAR Amendments and the IMO Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued
at Sea were drafted after the Tampa incident in 2001. The captain of the Norwegian container ship Tampa
rescued 438 asylum seekers from drowning in international waters between Christmas Island (Australia) and
Indonesia. The master of the ship first headed towards Indonesia, but this elicited threats from some of the
migrants, who insisted on being taken to Christmas Island. As the captain wanted to enter Australian territ-
orial waters, Australian Special Air Services intercepted and boarded the ship. The whole incident gave rise
to a very complex international political situation.
Malta's interest in acceding to the Conventions may have changed now that Malta is facing similar is-
sues in the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, Malta's reputation is without any doubt at stake.
V
CONCLUSION
The Arab Spring highlighted once more the problem of migrants at sea. Due to the increased loss of life
in the Mediterranean in 2011, the negotiations on the Draft Regional Agreement on concerted procedures
relating to the disembarkation of persons rescued at sea in the Mediterranean Basin were speeded up.
Malta plays an important role in this agreement due to its enormous SRR. One of the problems that should
be tackled is the coordination between the several SRRs in the Mediterranean. Also, a system of burden-
sharing has to be part of the agreement. If the Regional Agreement meets part of the concerns Malta has,
it could go beyond addressing purely maritime matters to include provisions on human rights and humanit-
arian law. Indeed, if Malta wants to avoid losing its ‘good’ reputation it should accept that the law of the
sea is not isolated from other parts of the law. On the one hand the draft MoU contains certain elements
that are negative for Malta, such as the provision that the primary responsibility rests with the *113 Govern-
ment responsible for the respective SRR, and the definition of what constitutes a distress phase. On the other
hand, the draft MoU is positive for Malta as it takes into consideration the respective capacities of a State
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when providing a place of safety and the particular circumstances of the case. Finally, States have to cooper-
ate in providing a suitable place of safety, taking into account relevant factors, risks and circumstances, par-
ticularly when the number of survivors exceeds the capacity of the responsible State.
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